- __tests__/claude-usage.test.js (119 cases): sanitizer contract and idempotence, dropped values (unknown fields, negative, past 2^53, detail outside its regex, status outside the enum, bad dates, model keys), list bounds, token isolation both ways, 503 naming each variable, 413 at 65 537 bytes and /hosts/<id> still 413 at 4 097, atomic mode-600 write, POST then GET round trip, exact staleness boundary under a frozen clock, no_data degradation, rejection logs, COPY line. - writes.test.js: POST /claude-usage may write only in the directory of CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH, its rejections write nothing, GET /claude-usage joins the read routes. - README.md and CLAUDE.md: both routes, the three env vars, the /data/claude-usage read-write mount owned by uid 1000, the token table. Resolves #48 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
262 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
262 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# vps-health-api
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Lightweight health monitoring API for the VPS. Node 22, HTTP-native, zero runtime deps.
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## Endpoints
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Read endpoints require `Authorization: Bearer $HEALTH_TOKEN`. Each write
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endpoint has its own token — `$HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` for workstation snapshots,
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`$CLAUDE_USAGE_INGEST_TOKEN` for the Claude usage snapshot — so an agent can
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push its data without gaining read access to the Defenseurs reports, and
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neither ingestion token opens the other route.
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| Method | Path | Token | Description |
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|--------|------|-------|-------------|
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| GET | `/health` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | CPU, memory, disk, uptime, Logto reachability |
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| GET | `/defenseurs` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | Defenseurs executive status (status.json) |
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| GET | `/defenseurs/findings?project=X` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | Detailed findings for a project's Defenseur |
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| GET | `/defenseurs/state` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | Sergent's per-finding state (findings-state.json) |
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| GET | `/reports/scans?date=YYYY-MM-DD` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | Aggregated scan reports for a UTC date |
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| GET | `/hosts` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | Latest snapshot of every allowlisted workstation |
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| POST | `/hosts/<id>` | `HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` | Ingest one workstation snapshot |
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| GET | `/claude-usage` | `HEALTH_TOKEN` | Latest Claude usage snapshot, with server-side staleness |
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| POST | `/claude-usage` | `CLAUDE_USAGE_INGEST_TOKEN` | Ingest the Claude usage snapshot |
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Routing resolves before authentication: an unknown path or a wrong method
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answers `404`, never `401`.
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### `POST /hosts/<id>`
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Body: the `GET /health` payload minus `logto` and `timestamp` — `hostname`,
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`uptime`, `cpu{model,cores,loadAvg,usagePercent}`,
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`memory{totalGB,usedGB,freeGB,usagePercent}`, `disk{…same four…}`.
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`loadAvg` must hold exactly 3 finite numbers (the 1, 5 and 15-minute
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averages); any other length is a `400`.
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`<id>` must match `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,31}$` and be listed in
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`HOSTS_ALLOWED_IDS`. That regex is the path-traversal control — anything that
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fails it never reaches a handler.
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| Code | Case |
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|------|------|
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| 204 | Snapshot accepted and written |
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| 400 | Unparsable JSON, missing field, or wrong type |
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| 401 | Ingest token missing or wrong |
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| 403 | `<id>` well-formed but not in the allowlist |
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| 404 | `<id>` outside the format (never reaches the handler) |
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| 413 | Body past 4 KiB — connection cut |
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| 503 | `HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` not configured (fail-closed) |
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The stored object is rebuilt field by field from a whitelist (numbers must be
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finite, strings are capped at 128 chars, everything else dropped) and written
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atomically via a temp file + `rename`. `receivedAt` is stamped by the server on
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arrival; a client-supplied timestamp is ignored.
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Strings are truncated, not filtered: control characters and markup are kept so
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a legitimate value is never mangled. Consumers must escape them when rendering
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(React text nodes do; `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` or an `href` would not).
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A process killed mid-write can leave a `.<id>.<pid>.<ms>.tmp` file behind.
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Startup removes the ones older than an hour; `GET /hosts` never reads them.
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Example:
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```
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curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" --data @snapshot.json \
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"https://health.lacompagniemaximus.com/hosts/thinkpad"
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```
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### `GET /hosts`
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```
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{ "staleAfterSeconds": 900,
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"hosts": [ { "id", "hostname", "uptime", "cpu", "memory", "disk",
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"receivedAt", "ageSeconds", "online" } ] }
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```
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One entry per allowlisted id. `online = ageSeconds <= staleAfterSeconds`,
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computed server-side. A host that never checked in — or whose snapshot file is
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unreadable — degrades to `{ id, receivedAt: null, ageSeconds: null, online:
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false, neverSeen: true }` instead of failing the response, so the dashboard can
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say "agent not installed" during commissioning.
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### `POST /claude-usage`
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Body: the Claude usage snapshot, contract `schemaVersion: 1`, shared with the
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workstation agent and the admin dashboard:
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```jsonc
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{
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"schemaVersion": 1,
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"generatedAt": "2026-09-27T19:00:00.000Z", // workstation clock, informative
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"claudeCodeVersion": "2.1.283",
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"timeZone": "America/Toronto",
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"limits": {
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"status": "ok", // ok | token_expired | http_error | unavailable | disabled
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"detail": "http_429", // optional reason code
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"fetchedAt": "2026-09-27T19:00:00.000Z", // or null
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"items": [ { "kind": "session", "group": "session", "percent": 1,
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"severity": "normal", "resetsAt": "2026-09-27T21:30:00Z", "model": null } ]
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},
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"days": [ { "date": "2026-09-27",
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"models": { "claude-opus-5-5": { "input": 2, "output": 1950, "cacheCreation": 43176,
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"cacheRead": 33814, "requests": 1 } } } ],
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"projects": [ { "name": "simpl-resultat", "work": 123456, "cacheRead": 7890123, "requests": 812 } ]
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}
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```
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The server rebuilds it from a whitelist (`sanitizeClaudeUsage` in
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`claude-usage.js`, a pure module the agent can test against). An unknown field
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is dropped; an invalid value is dropped (the key is left out), never coerced:
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- numbers must be safe integers ≥ 0 (`Number.isSafeInteger`); `percent` 0–100;
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- `limits.status` must be in the enum; `limits.detail` must match
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`^[a-z0-9_]{1,32}$` (a reason code, never free text);
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- `days` ≤ 31 (past that, the most recent 31), `date` `^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$`
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and a real calendar day; `models` ≤ 12 keys matching
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`^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.\-]{0,63}$`; `limits.items` ≤ 12; `projects` ≤ 9;
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- timestamps must be full ISO 8601 with an offset; other strings are
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truncated to 128 characters.
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| Code | Case |
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|------|------|
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| 204 | Snapshot accepted and written |
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| 400 | Unparsable JSON, a body that is not an object, or `schemaVersion` other than 1 |
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| 401 | Token missing or wrong — including `HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` or `HEALTH_TOKEN` |
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| 413 | Body past 64 KiB (65 536 bytes received) — connection cut |
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| 503 | `CLAUDE_USAGE_INGEST_TOKEN` not configured (fail-closed) |
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`receivedAt` is stamped by the server; the file is written atomically (temp
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file with the pid in its name, mode 600, then `rename`).
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```
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curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAUDE_USAGE_INGEST_TOKEN" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" --data @claude-usage.json \
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"https://health.lacompagniemaximus.com/claude-usage"
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```
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### `GET /claude-usage`
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```
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{ "staleAfterSeconds": 2700, "receivedAt": "…", "ageSeconds": 42,
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"stale": false, "snapshot": { …sanitized snapshot… } }
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```
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The stored file is re-run through the sanitizer on the way out.
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`stale = ageSeconds > staleAfterSeconds`, decided by the server only — the
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dashboard displays it, it does not recompute it. A missing or unreadable file
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(corrupt, off-contract, no usable `receivedAt`) answers
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`200 { "status": "no_data" }`.
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### `GET /defenseurs/state`
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Serves the Sergent's `findings-state.json` verbatim — per-finding `firstSeen`,
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`unverified` status and 30-day history. It is the only source that carries a
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finding's age, which is why the admin dashboard's drill-down reads it alongside
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`/defenseurs`. The file is not parsed or checked for freshness here: the Sergent
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writes it atomically and quarantines unreadable state itself, and staleness is
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judged by the reader.
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- `200` — raw file content
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- `200 { status: "no_data" }` — file absent or unreadable (same contract as `/defenseurs`)
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- `401` — missing or invalid token
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```
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curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $HEALTH_TOKEN" \
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"https://health.lacompagniemaximus.com/defenseurs/state"
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```
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### `GET /defenseurs/findings`
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Query params:
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- `project` (required) — project name, looked up in `agents-map.json` (e.g. `la-suite-booking`)
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- `category` (optional) — exact match, one of `deps|secrets|code|acces|infra`
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- `severity` (optional) — threshold, one of `CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFO`
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- default (no param): `MEDIUM`, `HIGH`, `CRITICAL`
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- `LOW` returns `LOW`+`MEDIUM`+`HIGH`+`CRITICAL` but still hides `INFO`
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- `INFO` returns `INFO` only (explicit opt-in)
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Responses:
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- `200 { agent, project, timestamp, findings: Finding[] }` — report present (empty `findings` if clean scan; no `status` field)
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- `200 { findings: [], status: "no_data" }` — no report on file for the agent
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- `400` — missing `project` or invalid `category` / `severity`
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- `401` — missing or invalid token
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- `404` — unknown project
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- `500` — `agents-map.json` unreadable or corrupted
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Example:
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```
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curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $HEALTH_TOKEN" \
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"https://health.lacompagniemaximus.com/defenseurs/findings?project=la-suite-booking&severity=HIGH"
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```
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## Config
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| Env var | Default | Purpose |
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|---------|---------|---------|
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| `PORT` | `3001` | HTTP port |
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| `HEALTH_TOKEN` | — | Bearer token for the read routes (fail-closed if missing) |
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| `REPORTS_DIR` | `/data/defenseurs/reports` | Scan reports dir |
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| `DEFENSEURS_STATUS_PATH` | `/data/defenseurs/status.json` | Served by `/defenseurs` |
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| `DEFENSEURS_FINDINGS_STATE_PATH` | `/data/defenseurs/findings-state.json` | Served by `/defenseurs/state` |
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| `DEFENSEURS_AGENTS_MAP_PATH` | `/data/defenseurs/agents-map.json` | Project -> agent snapshot |
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| `LOGTO_HEALTH_URL` | auth.lacompagniemaximus.com | Logto OIDC discovery URL |
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| `HOSTS_DIR` | `/data/hosts` | Where workstation snapshots are **written** |
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| `HOSTS_ALLOWED_IDS` | `thinkpad` | Comma-separated allowlist of host ids |
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| `HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` | — | Bearer token for `POST /hosts/<id>` (503 if missing) |
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| `HOSTS_STALE_SECONDS` | `900` | Age past which a host is reported offline |
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| `CLAUDE_USAGE_INGEST_TOKEN` | — | Bearer token for `POST /claude-usage` (503 if missing) |
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| `CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH` | `/data/claude-usage/claude-usage.json` | Where the Claude usage snapshot is **written** |
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| `CLAUDE_USAGE_STALE_SECONDS` | `2700` | Age past which `GET /claude-usage` reports `stale: true` |
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## Bind-mounts (Coolify)
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Mounted read-only (`:ro`) — written on the host by the Defenseurs Sergent:
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- `/data/defenseurs` -> `/data/defenseurs:ro` — holds `status.json`,
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`findings-state.json` and `agents-map.json`, all written there directly by
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the Sergent. (`/home/defenseur/defenseurs/status.json` is an obsolete decoy
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nobody reads.)
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- `/home/defenseur/defenseurs/reports` -> `/data/defenseurs/reports:ro` — its
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own mount, nested inside the previous one.
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Two layers keep the API out of these files: the `:ro` mode (a suffix on the
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Coolify destination path, copied as-is into the generated compose), and Unix
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permissions (content owned by `defenseur:defenseur`, uid and gid 1001,
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directories 755/775, files 664, while the container runs as uid 1000 with no
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supplementary group). The group bits grant write, so the second layer holds
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only while the owning group is not gid 1000 (`node` in the image, `ubuntu` on
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the host): a `chgrp ubuntu` would drop it silently.
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`__tests__/writes.test.js` pins that `node:fs` writes go nowhere but
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`HOSTS_DIR` — and, for `POST /claude-usage` only, the directory of
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`CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH` — and that the only shell commands are the two read-only
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ones in `metrics.js`, on every path it exercises: boot, nominal reads and
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ingest, rejections, invalid input, a corrupt file, missing files.
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Read-write — the API is the writer:
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- `<host>/data/hosts/` -> `/data/hosts/` (`HOSTS_DIR`). Must be writable by uid
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1000, the `node` user the container runs as, otherwise every ingest 500s.
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- `<host>/data/claude-usage/` -> `/data/claude-usage/` (directory of
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`CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH`). Same rule: read-write, owned by uid 1000, otherwise
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every `POST /claude-usage` 500s. Mount the directory, never the file: the
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snapshot is replaced by `rename`, which a file bind would not follow.
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## Workstation agent
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`agent/` holds the zero-dependency collector that runs from cron on a
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workstation and feeds `POST /hosts/<id>`. It is not part of the server image —
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it is installed by copying files onto the machine it measures. Install steps,
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crontab line and failure modes: [`agent/README.md`](agent/README.md).
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## Tests
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```
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npm install
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npm test
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```
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