const http = require("node:http");
const fs = require("node:fs");
const os = require("node:os");
const path = require("node:path");
const child_process = require("node:child_process");
const { fileURLToPath } = require("node:url");

// The API's write surfaces are HOSTS_DIR (issue #36) and, since #48, the
// directory of CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH, written by POST /claude-usage only. Every
// case below allows HOSTS_DIR alone, except the POST /claude-usage one, which
// allows its own directory alone.
//
// Since 2026-09-30 the two Defenseurs mounts are read-only in the container
// (`:ro` on the Coolify destination). A write added one day under REPORTS_DIR
// or /data/defenseurs would not fail in the other test files: their fixtures
// live in a writable temp dir, and CI runs as root, so a chmod-555 fixture
// would prove nothing either. It would fail in production, as a 500 (EROFS)
// on the route that tried it. This file moves that failure to CI, for the
// paths it exercises: boot, the nominal reads and ingest, and the degraded
// ones (rejections, invalid input, a corrupt file, missing files).
//
// Every node:fs function that can write is spied BEFORE a fresh require,
// because the runtime modules destructure their fs functions at load time
// (same technique as the timingSafeEqual spy in auth.test.js). Every call is
// recorded, whoever makes it, then passed through to the real function. No
// attribution by call stack (#40): a function handed as-is to an asynchronous
// mechanism, `process.nextTick(writeFileSync, file, data)` or
// `res.on("finish", writeFileSync.bind(null, file, data))`, runs with no
// runtime frame on its stack, and a stack filter let it through. The price is
// that a write made by the test runner itself while a case runs would fail the
// case: the right way to fail. A shell command can write too, out of the fs
// spies' sight, so child_process is spied the same way and the set of commands
// is pinned to the two read-only ones metrics.js runs.
//
// The test edits its own fixtures in the degraded case. Those edits go through
// `real`, the functions taken before any spy exists, so the spies never have
// to look away.
//
// Limits: a path no case takes stays out of sight, and so does a write
// deferred past settle() (a timer longer than 20 ms).
//
// Boot is exercised by calling the exported sweepStaleTempFiles(), which is
// what the `require.main === module` block runs before listen. That block
// never runs in-process, so its content is pinned at the end of this file.

const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
const TOKEN = "test-token";
const INGEST_TOKEN = "test-ingest-token";
const CLAUDE_TOKEN = "test-claude-token";
const ORPHAN = ".thinkpad.4242.1700000000000.tmp";

// The real functions, taken at load time, before any spy: the test's own
// fixture edits go through them and stay out of the logs. Only single-call
// functions belong here. `rmSync(dir, { recursive: true })` would not do: it
// calls the public fs.rmdirSync internally, which is the spy by then.
const real = { writeFileSync: fs.writeFileSync, rmSync: fs.rmSync, renameSync: fs.renameSync };

// Runtime file = under the repo root, outside node_modules and __tests__.
// Used to purge the module cache.
function isRuntimeFile(file) {
  const rel = path.relative(REPO_ROOT, file);
  if (rel === "" || rel === ".." || rel.startsWith(`..${path.sep}`) || path.isAbsolute(rel)) return false;
  const top = rel.split(path.sep)[0];
  return top !== "node_modules" && top !== "__tests__";
}

// Write APIs of node:fs, by the argument(s) naming what gets written. Each is
// spied in its callback, Sync and fs.promises forms, when that form exists.
const O_WRITE =
  fs.constants.O_WRONLY | fs.constants.O_RDWR | fs.constants.O_CREAT | fs.constants.O_TRUNC | fs.constants.O_APPEND;

function opensForWriting(flags) {
  if (flags === undefined || flags === null || typeof flags === "function") return false; // "r"
  if (typeof flags === "number") return (flags & O_WRITE) !== 0;
  return /[wa+]/.test(String(flags));
}

// mkdtemp's argument is a prefix: `<dir>/x` creates `<dir>/xXXXXXX` below
// <dir>, but `<dir>` alone creates the sibling `<dir>XXXXXX`. Checking the
// prefix plus one character tells the two apart.
function mkdtempTarget(prefix) {
  if (prefix instanceof URL) return `${fileURLToPath(prefix)}X`;
  if (typeof prefix === "string" || Buffer.isBuffer(prefix)) return `${prefix.toString()}X`;
  return prefix;
}

const at = (...indexes) => (args) => indexes.map((i) => args[i]);
const WRITE_APIS = [
  // The destination is the first argument.
  ...[
    "writeFile", "appendFile", "unlink", "mkdir", "rm", "rmdir", "truncate",
    "chmod", "lchmod", "chown", "lchown", "utimes", "lutimes", "createWriteStream",
  ].map((name) => [name, at(0)]),
  ["mkdtemp", (args) => [mkdtempTarget(args[0])]],
  // Only the destination (second argument) is written.
  ...["copyFile", "cp", "link", "symlink"].map((name) => [name, at(1)]),
  // Both ends of a rename change.
  ["rename", at(0, 1)],
  // Metadata changes through a file descriptor: the target cannot be proven,
  // so the fd itself is recorded and fails the path rule.
  ...["fchmod", "fchown", "futimes"].map((name) => [name, at(0)]),
  // An open is a write only when its flags say so.
  ["open", (args) => (opensForWriting(args[1]) ? [args[0]] : null)],
];

// The two commands metrics.js runs, to read /proc/stat and the root disk.
const ALLOWED_COMMANDS = ["df -k /", "head -1 /proc/stat"];
const CHILD_PROCESS_APIS = ["exec", "execSync", "execFile", "execFileSync", "spawn", "spawnSync", "fork"];

// `exec("cmd")` and `execFile("file", ["arg"])` both come out as one string.
function commandOf(args) {
  return (Array.isArray(args[1]) ? [args[0], ...args[1]] : [args[0]]).map(String).join(" ");
}

let log = [];
let commandLog = [];

function drain() {
  const out = log;
  log = [];
  return out;
}

function foreignCommands() {
  return commandLog.filter((command) => !ALLOWED_COMMANDS.includes(command));
}

function installWriteSpies() {
  for (const [name, targetsOf] of WRITE_APIS) {
    for (const [owner, key] of [
      [fs, name],
      [fs, `${name}Sync`],
      [fs.promises, name],
    ]) {
      // lchmod is an own property holding undefined on Linux.
      if (typeof owner[key] !== "function") continue;
      const original = owner[key];
      vi.spyOn(owner, key).mockImplementation(function (...args) {
        const targets = targetsOf(args);
        if (targets) log.push({ fn: key, targets });
        return original.apply(this, args);
      });
    }
  }
}

function installCommandSpies() {
  for (const key of CHILD_PROCESS_APIS) {
    if (typeof child_process[key] !== "function") continue;
    const original = child_process[key];
    vi.spyOn(child_process, key).mockImplementation(function (...args) {
      commandLog.push(commandOf(args));
      return original.apply(this, args);
    });
  }
}

// Every runtime module, not only index.js: a module left in the cache would
// keep the functions it destructured under a previous test's spies, which
// vi.restoreAllMocks() has turned back into silent pass-throughs.
function purgeRuntimeModules() {
  for (const file of Object.keys(require.cache)) {
    if (isRuntimeFile(file)) delete require.cache[file];
  }
}

// Equal to the allowed directory or below it — HOSTS_DIR unless the case names
// another one (only POST /claude-usage does, for its own directory, #48).
// path.relative rather than startsWith, so a sibling such as `<tmp>/hosts-evil`
// does not pass. A file descriptor, or any argument that is not a path, cannot
// be proven and fails.
function toPath(arg) {
  if (typeof arg === "string") return path.resolve(arg);
  if (Buffer.isBuffer(arg)) return path.resolve(arg.toString());
  if (arg instanceof URL) return path.resolve(fileURLToPath(arg));
  return null;
}

function violations(writes, allowedDir = process.env.HOSTS_DIR) {
  const hostsDir = path.resolve(allowedDir);
  return writes.flatMap(({ fn, targets }) =>
    targets
      .filter((arg) => {
        const target = toPath(arg);
        if (target === null) return true;
        const rel = path.relative(hostsDir, target);
        return rel === ".." || rel.startsWith(`..${path.sep}`) || path.isAbsolute(rel);
      })
      .map((arg) => `${fn}(${typeof arg === "string" ? arg : typeof arg})`),
  );
}

function validSnapshot() {
  return {
    hostname: "thinkpad-x1",
    uptime: 4242,
    cpu: { model: "Intel Core i7", cores: 8, loadAvg: [0.5, 0.4, 0.3], usagePercent: 12 },
    memory: { totalGB: 32, usedGB: 12.5, freeGB: 19.5, usagePercent: 39 },
    disk: { totalGB: 500, usedGB: 220, freeGB: 280, usagePercent: 44 },
  };
}

function validClaudeUsage() {
  return {
    schemaVersion: 1,
    timeZone: "America/Toronto",
    limits: { status: "ok", fetchedAt: "2026-09-30T07:30:00.000Z", items: [] },
    // Two days: POST archives the first one into history/ (#55).
    days: [
      { date: "2026-09-29", models: { "claude-opus-5-5": { input: 1, output: 1, requests: 1 } } },
      { date: "2026-09-30", models: { "claude-opus-5-5": { input: 1, output: 2, requests: 1 } } },
    ],
    projects: [{ name: "proj", work: 3, cacheRead: 4, requests: 1 }],
  };
}

function historyFixturePath(month) {
  return path.join(tmpDir, "claude-usage", "history", `${month}.json`);
}

function claudeUsageFixturePath() {
  return path.join(tmpDir, "claude-usage", "claude-usage.json");
}

function writeJson(file, value) {
  fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
  fs.writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(value));
}

// One macrotask more, so a write deferred past res.end() is caught too.
function settle() {
  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
}

let tmpDir;
let server;
let baseUrl;
let bootWrites;

// A transport failure (a connection cut before a 413 is read) comes back as
// "transport-error", so it fails an assertion instead of passing for a code.
async function send(route, { method = "GET", auth = `Bearer ${TOKEN}`, body } = {}) {
  const headers = auth ? { Authorization: auth } : {};
  if (body !== undefined) headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json";
  try {
    const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${route}`, { method, headers, body });
    const text = await res.text();
    let json = null;
    try {
      json = JSON.parse(text);
    } catch {
      // Not JSON: the status alone is asserted.
    }
    return { status: res.status, body: json };
  } catch {
    return { status: "transport-error", body: null };
  }
}

// Created before the spies: nothing here is recorded.
function writeFixtures() {
  tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vps-health-writes-test-"));
  const defenseurs = path.join(tmpDir, "defenseurs");
  const reports = path.join(defenseurs, "reports");
  const hosts = path.join(tmpDir, "hosts");
  const report = (timestamp) => ({
    agent: "defenseur-proj",
    timestamp,
    findings: [{ severity: "HIGH", category: "deps", title: "vulnerable dependency" }],
  });

  writeJson(path.join(defenseurs, "status.json"), {
    schemaVersion: 1,
    timestamp: "2026-09-30T07:30:00.000Z",
    agents: [{ name: "defenseur-proj", status: "ok" }],
  });
  writeJson(path.join(defenseurs, "findings-state.json"), {
    schemaVersion: 1,
    updatedAt: "2026-09-30T07:30:00.000Z",
    findings: { "proj:deps:1": { firstSeen: "2026-09-29T07:30:00.000Z" } },
  });
  writeJson(path.join(defenseurs, "agents-map.json"), { proj: "defenseur-proj" });
  writeJson(path.join(reports, "defenseur-proj_2026-09-30T07-30-00-000Z.json"), report("2026-09-30T07:30:00.000Z"));
  writeJson(path.join(reports, "archive", "defenseur-proj_2026-09-29T07-30-00-000Z.json"), report("2026-09-29T07:30:00.000Z"));
  // A stored snapshot, so GET /hosts runs its real read path, not neverSeen.
  writeJson(path.join(hosts, "thinkpad.json"), { ...validSnapshot(), receivedAt: new Date().toISOString() });
  // An orphan temp file older than an hour: the boot sweep must remove it,
  // which gives every test a write it can see (proof its spies are live).
  const orphan = path.join(hosts, ORPHAN);
  fs.writeFileSync(orphan, "{}");
  const twoHoursAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 2 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
  fs.utimesSync(orphan, twoHoursAgo, twoHoursAgo);

  process.env.HEALTH_TOKEN = TOKEN;
  process.env.HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN = INGEST_TOKEN;
  process.env.REPORTS_DIR = reports;
  process.env.DEFENSEURS_STATUS_PATH = path.join(defenseurs, "status.json");
  process.env.DEFENSEURS_FINDINGS_STATE_PATH = path.join(defenseurs, "findings-state.json");
  process.env.DEFENSEURS_AGENTS_MAP_PATH = path.join(defenseurs, "agents-map.json");
  process.env.HOSTS_DIR = hosts;
  process.env.HOSTS_ALLOWED_IDS = "thinkpad";
  // The Claude usage snapshot (#48): its own directory, beside HOSTS_DIR and
  // not under it, so a write there is checked against its own rule.
  writeJson(claudeUsageFixturePath(), { ...validClaudeUsage(), receivedAt: new Date().toISOString() });
  process.env.CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH = claudeUsageFixturePath();
  // An archived month (#55), so GET /claude-usage/history runs its read path.
  writeJson(historyFixturePath("2026-09"), {
    schemaVersion: 1,
    month: "2026-09",
    days: [{ date: "2026-09-28", models: {} }],
  });
  process.env.CLAUDE_USAGE_INGEST_TOKEN = CLAUDE_TOKEN;
  // Closed port: /health must never reach the real IdP.
  process.env.LOGTO_HEALTH_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:1/oidc/.well-known/openid-configuration";
}

beforeEach(async () => {
  writeFixtures();
  log = [];
  commandLog = [];
  installWriteSpies();
  installCommandSpies();
  purgeRuntimeModules();
  const { handler, sweepStaleTempFiles } = require("../index.js");
  sweepStaleTempFiles();
  server = http.createServer(handler);
  await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, resolve));
  baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
  bootWrites = drain();
});

afterEach(async () => {
  vi.restoreAllMocks();
  await new Promise((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
  fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});

describe("fs writes — the API writes only under HOSTS_DIR (#36)", () => {
  test("boot: module load and the temp-file sweep write only under HOSTS_DIR", () => {
    expect(bootWrites.map(({ fn }) => fn)).toContain("unlinkSync");
    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(process.env.HOSTS_DIR, ORPHAN))).toBe(false);
    expect(violations(bootWrites)).toEqual([]);
    expect(foreignCommands()).toEqual([]);
  });

  // Each route with the content that proves its fixture was really read: a
  // missing mount answers 200 no_data, which must not pass for a clean read.
  const READ_ROUTES = [
    ["/health", (body) => expect(body.cpu).toBeDefined()],
    ["/defenseurs", (body) => expect(body.agents).toHaveLength(1)],
    ["/defenseurs/state", (body) => expect(Object.keys(body.findings)).toHaveLength(1)],
    [
      "/defenseurs/findings?project=proj",
      (body) => {
        expect(body.agent).toBe("defenseur-proj");
        expect(body.findings).toHaveLength(1);
      },
    ],
    ["/reports/scans?date=2026-09-30", (body) => expect(body.count).toBe(1)],
    [
      "/hosts",
      (body) => {
        const host = body.hosts.find(({ id }) => id === "thinkpad");
        expect(host.neverSeen).toBeUndefined();
        expect(host.receivedAt).toEqual(expect.any(String));
      },
    ],
    ["/claude-usage", (body) => expect(body.snapshot.projects).toHaveLength(1)],
    ["/claude-usage/history", (body) => expect(body.days).toEqual([{ date: "2026-09-28", models: {} }])],
  ];

  test.each(READ_ROUTES)("GET %s writes nothing, not even after the response", async (route, expectContent) => {
    // This test's own spies are live: they saw the boot sweep.
    expect(bootWrites).not.toHaveLength(0);

    const { status, body } = await send(route);
    expect(status).toBe(200);
    expect(body.status).not.toBe("no_data");
    expectContent(body);

    await settle();
    expect(drain()).toEqual([]);
    expect(foreignCommands()).toEqual([]);
  });

  test("POST /hosts/<id> writes, and only under HOSTS_DIR", async () => {
    const { status } = await send("/hosts/thinkpad", {
      method: "POST",
      auth: `Bearer ${INGEST_TOKEN}`,
      body: JSON.stringify(validSnapshot()),
    });
    expect(status).toBe(204);

    await settle();
    const writes = drain();
    expect(writes.map(({ fn }) => fn)).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(["writeFileSync", "renameSync"]));
    expect(violations(writes)).toEqual([]);
    expect(foreignCommands()).toEqual([]);
  });

  // The second write surface (#48). Its directory is the only one this case
  // allows: a write under HOSTS_DIR from this route would fail it too.
  test("POST /claude-usage writes, and only in the directory of CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH", async () => {
    const { status } = await send("/claude-usage", {
      method: "POST",
      auth: `Bearer ${CLAUDE_TOKEN}`,
      body: JSON.stringify(validClaudeUsage()),
    });
    expect(status).toBe(204);

    await settle();
    const writes = drain();
    expect(writes.map(({ fn }) => fn)).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(["writeFileSync", "renameSync"]));
    expect(violations(writes, path.dirname(process.env.CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH))).toEqual([]);
    // The archive (#55) is part of this surface, and the case proves it ran:
    // a rename onto the month file of the closed day.
    expect(writes.some(({ fn, targets }) => fn === "renameSync" && targets.includes(historyFixturePath("2026-09")))).toBe(true);
    expect(foreignCommands()).toEqual([]);
  });

  test("POST /claude-usage rejections and invalid input write nothing at all", async () => {
    expect(bootWrites).not.toHaveLength(0);
    const claude = `Bearer ${CLAUDE_TOKEN}`;
    const rejected = [
      [401, { auth: null, body: "{}" }],
      [401, { auth: `Bearer ${INGEST_TOKEN}`, body: JSON.stringify(validClaudeUsage()) }],
      [400, { auth: claude, body: "{not json" }],
      [400, { auth: claude, body: JSON.stringify({ ...validClaudeUsage(), schemaVersion: 2 }) }],
      [413, { auth: claude, body: "x".repeat(66000) }],
    ];
    for (const [expected, options] of rejected) {
      const { status } = await send("/claude-usage", { method: "POST", ...options });
      expect([options.body.length, status]).toEqual([options.body.length, expected]);
    }
    // A corrupt stored snapshot: where a "repair it on read" write would go.
    real.writeFileSync(process.env.CLAUDE_USAGE_PATH, "{corrupt");
    const { status, body } = await send("/claude-usage");
    expect(status).toBe(200);
    expect(body).toEqual({ status: "no_data" });
    // Same for a corrupt month of the archive, and for a refused range (#55).
    real.writeFileSync(historyFixturePath("2026-09"), "{corrupt");
    const history = await send("/claude-usage/history?from=2026-09&to=2026-09");
    expect([history.status, history.body]).toEqual([200, { from: "2026-09", to: "2026-09", days: [] }]);
    expect((await send("/claude-usage/history?from=2026-13")).status).toBe(400);

    await settle();
    expect(drain()).toEqual([]);
    expect(foreignCommands()).toEqual([]);
  });

  // The branches the nominal cases never take, and where the most plausible
  // future writes would land: quarantining a corrupt file, recreating a
  // missing one, logging a rejection or a refused payload to disk.
  test("rejections, invalid input, corrupt and missing files write nothing outside HOSTS_DIR", async () => {
    expect(bootWrites).not.toHaveLength(0);
    const ingest = `Bearer ${INGEST_TOKEN}`;
    const rejected = [
      [401, "/defenseurs", { auth: null }],
      [401, "/defenseurs", { auth: "Bearer wrong" }],
      [401, "/hosts", { auth: ingest }],
      [404, "/nope", {}],
      [400, "/defenseurs/findings", {}],
      [400, "/defenseurs/findings?project=proj&severity=BOGUS", {}],
      [404, "/defenseurs/findings?project=unknown", {}],
      [400, "/reports/scans?date=../../etc", {}],
      [401, "/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: "Bearer wrong", body: "{}" }],
      [403, "/hosts/laptop", { method: "POST", auth: ingest, body: JSON.stringify(validSnapshot()) }],
      [400, "/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: ingest, body: "{not json" }],
      [400, "/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: ingest, body: JSON.stringify({ hostname: "x" }) }],
      [413, "/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: ingest, body: "x".repeat(5000) }],
    ];
    for (const [expected, route, options] of rejected) {
      const { status } = await send(route, options);
      expect([options.method || "GET", route, status]).toEqual([options.method || "GET", route, expected]);
    }

    // A corrupt agents-map.json: where a quarantine rename would go.
    real.writeFileSync(process.env.DEFENSEURS_AGENTS_MAP_PATH, "{corrupt");
    expect((await send("/defenseurs/findings?project=proj")).status).toBe(500);

    // Missing Defenseurs files and a corrupt snapshot: where a "recreate it"
    // write would go. Each route must degrade, with the content that says so.
    // The reports directory is moved away rather than removed: one call.
    real.writeFileSync(process.env.DEFENSEURS_AGENTS_MAP_PATH, JSON.stringify({ proj: "defenseur-proj" }));
    real.rmSync(process.env.DEFENSEURS_STATUS_PATH);
    real.rmSync(process.env.DEFENSEURS_FINDINGS_STATE_PATH);
    real.renameSync(process.env.REPORTS_DIR, path.join(tmpDir, "reports-moved-away"));
    real.writeFileSync(path.join(process.env.HOSTS_DIR, "thinkpad.json"), "{corrupt");
    const degraded = [
      ["/defenseurs", (body) => expect(body.status).toBe("no_data")],
      ["/defenseurs/state", (body) => expect(body.status).toBe("no_data")],
      ["/defenseurs/findings?project=proj", (body) => expect(body).toEqual({ findings: [], status: "no_data" })],
      ["/reports/scans?date=2026-09-30", (body) => expect(body.count).toBe(0)],
      ["/hosts", (body) => expect(body.hosts.find(({ id }) => id === "thinkpad").neverSeen).toBe(true)],
    ];
    for (const [route, expectContent] of degraded) {
      const { status, body } = await send(route);
      expect([route, status]).toEqual([route, 200]);
      expectContent(body);
    }

    await settle();
    expect(violations(drain())).toEqual([]);
    expect(foreignCommands()).toEqual([]);
  });
});

describe("shell commands — only the two read-only metrics ones (#36)", () => {
  // Positive control for the child_process spies: /health must show exactly
  // the two commands. The other cases only check that nothing else ran.
  test("GET /health runs exactly `head -1 /proc/stat` and `df -k /`", async () => {
    const { status } = await send("/health");
    expect(status).toBe(200);
    expect([...new Set(commandLog)].sort()).toEqual([...ALLOWED_COMMANDS].sort());
  });
});

describe("fs writes — the entrypoint adds no write of its own", () => {
  // The block below never runs in-process: the tests above stand in for it by
  // calling the exported sweep. This pin keeps that stand-in honest. A new call
  // in the block (a PID file, a marker) must be looked at, then allowed here.
  // The comparison is an exact set, so a block that cannot be found or comes
  // back empty fails instead of passing vacuously.
  test("the main block only sweeps, creates the server and listens", () => {
    const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "index.js"), "utf-8");
    const start = source.indexOf("if (require.main === module) {");
    expect(start).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
    const block = source.slice(start, source.indexOf("\n}\n", start) + 2);
    const calls = [...block.matchAll(/([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*)\s*\(/g)]
      .map((match) => match[1])
      .filter((name) => name !== "if");
    expect([...new Set(calls)].sort()).toEqual(
      ["console.log", "http.createServer", "server.listen", "sweepStaleTempFiles"].sort(),
    );
  });
});