const http = require("node:http");
const fs = require("node:fs");
const os = require("node:os");
const path = require("node:path");

// Authentication safety net for the read routes.
//
// findings.test.js and health.test.js cover what each route *returns*; this
// file covers the gate in front of all of them. The small overlap on
// /defenseurs/findings and /health is deliberate: the value of this file is the
// complete route x failure-mode matrix in one place, so a routing/auth refactor
// that only rewires part of the table still fails loudly here.
//
// These tests describe the CURRENT behaviour of index.js. If one of them turns
// red after a refactor, the refactor changed the security contract.

const TOKEN = "test-token";

// Every GET route reachable by the handler. Any new route must be added here.
// POST /hosts/<id> is not a GET, so it gets its own describe block below —
// but it is covered, and any future route must be too.
const ROUTES = [
  "/health",
  "/defenseurs",
  "/defenseurs/findings",
  "/defenseurs/state",
  "/reports/scans",
  "/hosts",
];

// Ingest token, distinct from the read token on purpose: a read token must not
// open the write path, and a write token must not open the read routes.
const INGEST_TOKEN = "test-ingest-token";

let tmpDir;
let server;
let baseUrl;
let handler;

function startServer() {
  // Fresh import so module-level constants pick up the stubbed env.
  delete require.cache[require.resolve("../index.js")];
  ({ handler } = require("../index.js"));
  server = http.createServer(handler);
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    server.listen(0, () => {
      const { port } = server.address();
      baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
      resolve();
    });
  });
}

function stopServer() {
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    if (!server) return resolve();
    server.close(() => resolve());
  });
}

async function restartServer() {
  await stopServer();
  await startServer();
}

async function request(path, { method = "GET", auth = `Bearer ${TOKEN}` } = {}) {
  const headers = {};
  if (auth) headers.Authorization = auth;
  const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, { method, headers });
  const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
  return { status: res.status, body };
}

beforeEach(async () => {
  tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vps-health-auth-test-"));

  process.env.HEALTH_TOKEN = TOKEN;
  // Point every filesystem read at the temp dir so a rejected request can never
  // fall back to the host's real /data/defenseurs.
  process.env.REPORTS_DIR = path.join(tmpDir, "reports");
  process.env.DEFENSEURS_AGENTS_MAP_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, "agents-map.json");
  process.env.DEFENSEURS_STATUS_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, "status.json");
  process.env.DEFENSEURS_FINDINGS_STATE_PATH = path.join(tmpDir, "findings-state.json");
  process.env.HOSTS_DIR = path.join(tmpDir, "hosts");
  process.env.HOSTS_ALLOWED_IDS = "thinkpad";
  // Configured on purpose: an unset ingest token answers 503 before the header
  // is ever read, which would hide the 401 these tests are here to pin.
  process.env.HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN = INGEST_TOKEN;
  // Closed port: /health must never reach the real IdP. If the auth gate ever
  // fails open, the request errors out fast instead of hitting production.
  process.env.LOGTO_HEALTH_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:1/oidc/.well-known/openid-configuration";

  await startServer();
});

afterEach(async () => {
  await stopServer();
  fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});

describe("auth gate — missing Authorization header", () => {
  test.each(ROUTES)("401 on GET %s with no Authorization header", async (route) => {
    const { status, body } = await request(route, { auth: null });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    // Pin the gate itself: auth runs before any query-param validation, so
    // /defenseurs/findings and /reports/scans must answer 401, never 400.
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });
});

describe("auth gate — invalid token", () => {
  test.each(ROUTES)("401 on GET %s with a wrong bearer token", async (route) => {
    const { status, body } = await request(route, { auth: "Bearer wrong-token" });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });
});

describe("auth gate — malformed Authorization header", () => {
  // The scheme must be exactly `Bearer `, then the token is compared in
  // constant time via tokenMatches(), so these near-misses are all rejected.
  // /defenseurs stands in for the read routes: it serves the parc-wide
  // Defenseurs report and is the costliest to leak.
  const MALFORMED = [
    ["raw token without the Bearer scheme", TOKEN],
    ["lowercase scheme", `bearer ${TOKEN}`],
    ["scheme with no token", "Bearer"],
    // The separator is exactly one space: `startsWith("Bearer")` followed by
    // slice(7) would accept any byte in its place.
    ["tab instead of the space", `Bearer\t${TOKEN}`],
    ["any other byte instead of the space", `BearerX${TOKEN}`],
  ];

  test.each(MALFORMED)("401 on GET /defenseurs — %s", async (_label, header) => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/defenseurs", { auth: header });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });
});

describe("auth gate — near-miss tokens on the read routes", () => {
  // A comparison that stops at the first differing byte leaks the token's
  // length and prefix through timing (issue #17). These cases pin the
  // observable contract — exact match only — on every read route. They would
  // also pass against a naive `===`: the timing property itself is guarded by
  // the timingSafeEqual spy and the source pins below, not by these.
  const NEAR_MISSES = [
    ["token prefix", `Bearer ${TOKEN.slice(0, -1)}`],
    ["token with a suffix", `Bearer ${TOKEN}x`],
    ["double space after the scheme", `Bearer  ${TOKEN}`],
  ];
  const CASES = ROUTES.flatMap((route) => NEAR_MISSES.map(([label, header]) => [route, label, header]));

  test.each(CASES)("401 on GET %s — %s", async (route, _label, header) => {
    const { status, body } = await request(route, { auth: header });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });

  // `Bearer ` with an empty token cannot be sent over the wire: the HTTP
  // parser strips trailing whitespace and the server sees `Bearer`, already
  // covered above. The empty-token branch is pinned on the helper directly.
  test("tokenMatches rejects an empty token", () => {
    const { tokenMatches } = require("../index.js");
    expect(tokenMatches("", TOKEN)).toBe(false);
    expect(tokenMatches(TOKEN, TOKEN)).toBe(true);
  });
});

describe("auth gate — every comparison goes through timingSafeEqual on digests", () => {
  // Behavioural guard for issue #17, independent of how the code is written.
  // index.js destructures timingSafeEqual at load time, so the spy is set
  // BEFORE a fresh require. Each request must then reach timingSafeEqual with
  // two 32-byte buffers (SHA-256 digests). That fails for a short-circuiting
  // `===` (never called), for a per-kind early return (never called on the
  // read path), and for raw strings behind a length check (the GHSA-376v-xgjx-7mfr
  // shape: never called when lengths differ, called with non-digests otherwise).
  const crypto = require("node:crypto");
  let spy;

  beforeEach(async () => {
    spy = vi.spyOn(crypto, "timingSafeEqual");
    await restartServer();
  });

  afterEach(() => {
    spy.mockRestore();
  });

  function expectDigestComparison() {
    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
    const [a, b] = spy.mock.calls[0];
    expect(Buffer.isBuffer(a) && Buffer.isBuffer(b)).toBe(true);
    expect([a.length, b.length]).toEqual([32, 32]);
  }

  test.each(ROUTES)("GET %s with a shorter wrong token compares two digests", async (route) => {
    const { status } = await request(route, { auth: "Bearer x" });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expectDigestComparison();
  });

  test.each(ROUTES)("GET %s with a same-length wrong token compares two digests", async (route) => {
    const sameLength = "x".repeat(TOKEN.length);
    const { status } = await request(route, { auth: `Bearer ${sameLength}` });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expectDigestComparison();
  });

  test("GET /defenseurs with the right token compares two digests", async () => {
    const { status } = await request("/defenseurs");
    expect(status).toBe(200);
    expectDigestComparison();
  });

  test("POST /hosts/<id> with a shorter wrong token compares two digests", async () => {
    const { status } = await request("/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: "Bearer x" });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expectDigestComparison();
  });
});

describe("auth gate — source pins: one constant-time comparison", () => {
  // Structural complement to the spy above: read index.js, comments stripped,
  // and check how checkAuth() and tokenMatches() are written.
  const source = fs
    .readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "..", "index.js"), "utf-8")
    .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "")
    .replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, "");

  function functionBody(name) {
    const start = source.indexOf(`function ${name}(`);
    expect(start).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
    const rest = source.slice(start + 1);
    const next = rest.search(/^(async\s+)?function\s/m);
    return next === -1 ? rest : rest.slice(0, next);
  }

  // Every equality operator in a body, with its two operands.
  function comparisons(body) {
    return [...body.matchAll(/([\w."'$]+)\s*(===|!==|==|!=)\s*([\w."'$]+)/g)].map(
      ([, left, op, right]) => `${left} ${op} ${right}`,
    );
  }

  test("no direct equality against a Bearer string anywhere in index.js", () => {
    // Template literal (`Bearer ${x}`) or concatenation ("Bearer " + x), on
    // either side of == / ===.
    const bearerExpr = String.raw`(\`Bearer [^\`]*\`|["']Bearer ["']\s*\+\s*[\w.]+)`;
    const direct = new RegExp(String.raw`[!=]==?\s*${bearerExpr}|${bearerExpr}\s*[!=]==?`);
    expect(source).not.toMatch(direct);
  });

  test("checkAuth() has one tokenMatches call, one success exit, no token equality", () => {
    const body = functionBody("checkAuth");
    expect(body.match(/tokenMatches\(/g)).toHaveLength(1);
    // A single `return null`: no early success exit for one token kind.
    expect(body.match(/return\s+null\b/g)).toHaveLength(1);
    // Allowlist, both operand orders included: anything else (`want ===
    // header`, `expected === token`) is a new comparison on a secret.
    expect(comparisons(body).sort()).toEqual(['header === "string"', 'route.tokenKind === "ingest"']);
    expect(body).not.toMatch(/isIngest\s*\?[^;]*tokenMatches/);
  });

  test("tokenMatches() hashes both sides before timingSafeEqual", () => {
    const body = functionBody("tokenMatches");
    expect(body.match(/createHash\("sha256"\)/g)).toHaveLength(2);
    expect(body.match(/timingSafeEqual\(/g)).toHaveLength(1);
    // No length check and no equality other than the type guards.
    expect(body).not.toMatch(/\.length\b/);
    expect(comparisons(body).sort()).toEqual(['expected !== "string"', 'provided !== "string"']);
  });
});

describe("auth gate — fail-closed when HEALTH_TOKEN is unset", () => {
  test("401 on GET /defenseurs even with a well-formed bearer token", async () => {
    delete process.env.HEALTH_TOKEN;
    await restartServer();
    const { status, body } = await request("/defenseurs", { auth: `Bearer ${TOKEN}` });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("HEALTH_TOKEN not configured");
  });
});

describe("routing", () => {
  test("404 on an unknown route", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/nope");
    expect(status).toBe(404);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Not found");
  });

  test.each(ROUTES)("404 on POST %s (method not allowed)", async (route) => {
    const { status, body } = await request(route, { method: "POST" });
    expect(status).toBe(404);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Not found");
  });

  // Current ordering: the route/method check runs BEFORE authentication, so an
  // unauthenticated caller gets 404 rather than 401 on these. Documented as-is;
  // any refactor that flips the order will turn these red on purpose.
  test("404 (not 401) on an unknown route without Authorization", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/nope", { auth: null });
    expect(status).toBe(404);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Not found");
  });

  test("404 (not 401) on POST /health without Authorization", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/health", { method: "POST", auth: null });
    expect(status).toBe(404);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Not found");
  });
});

// The ingest path is the only write surface on this service, and the only one
// reachable with a token that is NOT the read token. Both directions of that
// separation are pinned here: a read token must not write, a write token must
// not read. The gate answers before the request body is ever buffered, so an
// unauthenticated caller cannot make the server hold 4 KiB on its behalf.
describe("auth gate — ingest route", () => {
  test("401 on POST /hosts/<id> with no Authorization header", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: null });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });

  test("401 on POST /hosts/<id> with the read token", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/hosts/thinkpad", {
      method: "POST",
      auth: `Bearer ${TOKEN}`,
    });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });

  test("401 on GET /hosts with the ingest token", async () => {
    const { status, body } = await request("/hosts", { auth: `Bearer ${INGEST_TOKEN}` });
    expect(status).toBe(401);
    expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
  });

  // An unknown host id never reaches the handler: the route regex is the
  // path-traversal control, so a malformed id is a 404, not a 403 — and that
  // 404 arrives before authentication, like every other routing decision.
  test("404 (not 401, not 403) on POST /hosts/../../etc/passwd", async () => {
    const { status } = await request("/hosts/../../etc/passwd", { method: "POST", auth: null });
    expect(status).toBe(404);
  });
});