From 5074f95d0ae1fcfef9c14acb661e656538895f14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: le king fu Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2026 16:13:16 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] test(auth): guard tokenMatches itself and close the pin's blind spots Review of #30 found four mutations that left the suite green: an early success return for the read kind, a reversed `want === header` comparison, and tokenMatches() reduced to `===` or to raw strings behind a length check (the GHSA-376v-xgjx-7mfr shape). Behavioural guard: a spy on crypto.timingSafeEqual, set before a fresh require of index.js, requires every request (6 read routes, short and same-length wrong tokens, the right token, the ingest route) to compare two 32-byte digests. Source pins now also allowlist every equality operator in checkAuth() (both operand orders), require a single `return null`, and check that tokenMatches() hashes both sides without a length test. All seven mutations (the reviewer's four, the original three) now turn 13-15 tests red. CLAUDE.md no longer claims the pin covers the helper. Refs #17 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- CLAUDE.md | 6 +-- __tests__/auth.test.js | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md index 6df53ab..bf6e078 100644 --- a/CLAUDE.md +++ b/CLAUDE.md @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Ordre **non negociable**, fige par deux tests `404 (not 401)` dans `__tests__/au Consequence voulue : un appelant non authentifie sur une route inconnue voit 404, pas 401. Ne pas « corriger » cet ordre en mettant l'auth d'abord. - Fail-closed : `HEALTH_TOKEN` absent -> 401 sur les lectures ; `HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` absent -> 503 sur l'ingestion -- `tokenMatches()` (`timingSafeEqual` sur empreintes SHA-256, longueurs egalisees par le hachage) compare **les deux tokens** depuis l'issue #17 : `checkAuth()` n'a qu'une expression de comparaison, seul le token attendu varie. Ne jamais revenir a une egalite de chaine (`` header === `Bearer ${x}` ``) : elle s'arrete au premier octet different et fuit longueur et prefixe par le temps de reponse. Un test de timing serait instable ; la garde est une epingle sur le source dans `__tests__/auth.test.js` +- `tokenMatches()` (`timingSafeEqual` sur empreintes SHA-256, longueurs egalisees par le hachage) compare **les deux tokens** depuis l'issue #17 : `checkAuth()` n'a qu'une expression de comparaison, seul le token attendu varie. Ne jamais revenir a une egalite de chaine (`` header === `Bearer ${x}` ``) : elle s'arrete au premier octet different et fuit longueur et prefixe par le temps de reponse. Un test de timing serait instable ; la garde est double dans `__tests__/auth.test.js` : un espion sur `crypto.timingSafeEqual` (pose avant un `require` frais, `index.js` destructurant l'import au chargement) exige que chaque requete compare deux empreintes de 32 octets, meme quand le token recu n'a pas la bonne longueur ; et des epingles sur le source de `checkAuth()` et de `tokenMatches()` - 401 passe avant 403 : un appelant sans token ne peut pas sonder l'allowlist - Chaque rejet 401/403 est journalise (`[auth] ip= id= reason=`), valeurs filtrees en ASCII imprimable pour empecher la forge de lignes de log - **Coolify** : `HEALTH_TOKEN` et `HOSTS_INGEST_TOKEN` doivent etre `is_runtime=true, is_buildtime=false`. Buildtime fait fuiter le secret en clair dans `application_deployment_queues.logs`. Voir `la-compagnie-maximus/docs/coolify-ops.md` section "Secrets en buildtime". @@ -59,11 +59,11 @@ curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat ~/.coolify-token)" \ ## Tests -- `npm test` (vitest) — 284 cas +- `npm test` (vitest) — 299 cas - `__tests__/findings.test.js` — `/defenseurs/findings` (14 cas : auth, validation, filtres severity/category, asymetrie INFO, scan clean vs no_data, JSON corrompu) - `__tests__/state.test.js` — `/defenseurs/state` + non-regression `/defenseurs` apres extraction de `serveJsonFile()` (9 cas : corps identique octet pour octet sur un JSON non canonique, no_data, isolation des deux chemins, 401 sans token / mauvais token / token d'ingestion, 404 sur POST) - `__tests__/health.test.js` — module `metrics.js` + `/health` (6 cas : exports, payload champ pour champ, garde de latence) - - `__tests__/auth.test.js` — filet de securite auth sur les routes de lecture (50 cas : matrice route x mode d'echec, en-tetes malformes, quasi-rates du token sur les 6 routes de lecture, fail-closed, **2 cas `404 (not 401)` qui figent l'ordre routage -> auth**, et **une epingle sur le source** qui interdit toute egalite directe contre une chaine `Bearer` et exige un seul appel a `tokenMatches()` dans `checkAuth()`) + - `__tests__/auth.test.js` — filet de securite auth sur les routes de lecture (65 cas : matrice route x mode d'echec, en-tetes malformes, quasi-rates du token sur les 6 routes de lecture, fail-closed, **2 cas `404 (not 401)` qui figent l'ordre routage -> auth**, **un espion sur `timingSafeEqual`** qui exige deux empreintes de 32 octets a chaque requete, et **des epingles sur le source** : aucune egalite contre une chaine `Bearer`, un seul `tokenMatches()` et un seul `return null` dans `checkAuth()`, egalites limitees a une liste blanche, `tokenMatches()` qui hache les deux cotes sans test de longueur) - `__tests__/hosts.test.js` — matrice exhaustive des endpoints postes (155 cas : regex de route comme controle anti-traversee, 401 avant 403, cloisonnement des deux tokens, 503 fail-closed, reconstruction par liste blanche, 413, `neverSeen`, fraicheur serveur sous horloge figee, degradation de lecture) - `__tests__/agent.test.js` — agent poste (50 cas : contrat de payload verifie contre `sanitizeSnapshot()`, une seule tentative sans rejeu, timeout, codes de sortie, wrapper shell, et **le token absent de toute sortie d'echec, fragments de 5 caracteres compris**) - Runtime reste 0-dep ; vitest en devDep uniquement diff --git a/__tests__/auth.test.js b/__tests__/auth.test.js index 4aa5efa..f785cf3 100644 --- a/__tests__/auth.test.js +++ b/__tests__/auth.test.js @@ -118,8 +118,9 @@ describe("auth gate — invalid token", () => { describe("auth gate — malformed Authorization header", () => { // The scheme must be exactly `Bearer `, then the token is compared in - // constant time via tokenMatches(), so these near-misses are all rejected. /defenseurs stands in for the read routes: - // it serves the parc-wide Defenseurs report and is the costliest to leak. + // constant time via tokenMatches(), so these near-misses are all rejected. + // /defenseurs stands in for the read routes: it serves the parc-wide + // Defenseurs report and is the costliest to leak. const MALFORMED = [ ["raw token without the Bearer scheme", TOKEN], ["lowercase scheme", `bearer ${TOKEN}`], @@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ describe("auth gate — near-miss tokens on the read routes", () => { // length and prefix through timing (issue #17). These cases pin the // observable contract — exact match only — on every read route. They would // also pass against a naive `===`: the timing property itself is guarded by - // the source pin below, not by these. + // the timingSafeEqual spy and the source pins below, not by these. const NEAR_MISSES = [ ["token prefix", `Bearer ${TOKEN.slice(0, -1)}`], ["token with a suffix", `Bearer ${TOKEN}x`], @@ -162,23 +163,82 @@ describe("auth gate — near-miss tokens on the read routes", () => { }); }); -describe("auth gate — source pin: one constant-time comparison", () => { - // A timing test would be flaky, so the guard against a silent return to a - // short-circuiting comparison is structural: read index.js, comments - // stripped, and check how checkAuth() compares the header. +describe("auth gate — every comparison goes through timingSafeEqual on digests", () => { + // Behavioural guard for issue #17, independent of how the code is written. + // index.js destructures timingSafeEqual at load time, so the spy is set + // BEFORE a fresh require. Each request must then reach timingSafeEqual with + // two 32-byte buffers (SHA-256 digests). That fails for a short-circuiting + // `===` (never called), for a per-kind early return (never called on the + // read path), and for raw strings behind a length check (the GHSA-376v-xgjx-7mfr + // shape: never called when lengths differ, called with non-digests otherwise). + const crypto = require("node:crypto"); + let spy; + + beforeEach(async () => { + spy = vi.spyOn(crypto, "timingSafeEqual"); + await restartServer(); + }); + + afterEach(() => { + spy.mockRestore(); + }); + + function expectDigestComparison() { + expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + const [a, b] = spy.mock.calls[0]; + expect(Buffer.isBuffer(a) && Buffer.isBuffer(b)).toBe(true); + expect([a.length, b.length]).toEqual([32, 32]); + } + + test.each(ROUTES)("GET %s with a shorter wrong token compares two digests", async (route) => { + const { status } = await request(route, { auth: "Bearer x" }); + expect(status).toBe(401); + expectDigestComparison(); + }); + + test.each(ROUTES)("GET %s with a same-length wrong token compares two digests", async (route) => { + const sameLength = "x".repeat(TOKEN.length); + const { status } = await request(route, { auth: `Bearer ${sameLength}` }); + expect(status).toBe(401); + expectDigestComparison(); + }); + + test("GET /defenseurs with the right token compares two digests", async () => { + const { status } = await request("/defenseurs"); + expect(status).toBe(200); + expectDigestComparison(); + }); + + test("POST /hosts/ with a shorter wrong token compares two digests", async () => { + const { status } = await request("/hosts/thinkpad", { method: "POST", auth: "Bearer x" }); + expect(status).toBe(401); + expectDigestComparison(); + }); +}); + +describe("auth gate — source pins: one constant-time comparison", () => { + // Structural complement to the spy above: read index.js, comments stripped, + // and check how checkAuth() and tokenMatches() are written. const source = fs .readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "..", "index.js"), "utf-8") .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "") .replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, ""); - function checkAuthBody() { - const start = source.indexOf("function checkAuth("); + function functionBody(name) { + const start = source.indexOf(`function ${name}(`); expect(start).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0); const rest = source.slice(start + 1); const next = rest.search(/^(async\s+)?function\s/m); return next === -1 ? rest : rest.slice(0, next); } + // Every equality operator in a body, with its two operands. + function comparisons(body) { + return [...body.matchAll(/([\w."'$]+)\s*(===|!==|==|!=)\s*([\w."'$]+)/g)].map( + ([, left, op, right]) => `${left} ${op} ${right}`, + ); + } + test("no direct equality against a Bearer string anywhere in index.js", () => { // Template literal (`Bearer ${x}`) or concatenation ("Bearer " + x), on // either side of == / ===. @@ -187,15 +247,25 @@ describe("auth gate — source pin: one constant-time comparison", () => { expect(source).not.toMatch(direct); }); - test("checkAuth() calls tokenMatches exactly once, for both token kinds", () => { - const body = checkAuthBody(); + test("checkAuth() has one tokenMatches call, one success exit, no token equality", () => { + const body = functionBody("checkAuth"); expect(body.match(/tokenMatches\(/g)).toHaveLength(1); - // The comparison must not be chosen per token kind: `isIngest` may pick - // the expected token and the error, never the comparison itself. - // `typeof header === "string"` is the only allowed comparison on header. - expect(body).not.toMatch(/\bheader\s*[!=]==?(?!=)\s*[^"'\s]/); + // A single `return null`: no early success exit for one token kind. + expect(body.match(/return\s+null\b/g)).toHaveLength(1); + // Allowlist, both operand orders included: anything else (`want === + // header`, `expected === token`) is a new comparison on a secret. + expect(comparisons(body).sort()).toEqual(['header === "string"', 'route.tokenKind === "ingest"']); expect(body).not.toMatch(/isIngest\s*\?[^;]*tokenMatches/); }); + + test("tokenMatches() hashes both sides before timingSafeEqual", () => { + const body = functionBody("tokenMatches"); + expect(body.match(/createHash\("sha256"\)/g)).toHaveLength(2); + expect(body.match(/timingSafeEqual\(/g)).toHaveLength(1); + // No length check and no equality other than the type guards. + expect(body).not.toMatch(/\.length\b/); + expect(comparisons(body).sort()).toEqual(['expected !== "string"', 'provided !== "string"']); + }); }); describe("auth gate — fail-closed when HEALTH_TOKEN is unset", () => {