Milestone spec-refonte-rapports: reports hub + 4 sub-reports, per-domain
hooks, contextual keyword editing, category zoom with recursive CTE.
Dynamic pivot table removed. See CHANGELOG for the full list of changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wraps up the spec-oauth-keychain milestone: OAuth tokens in OS keychain,
HMAC-signed account cache, fallback banner, and Argon2id PIN hashing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Before this change, `license_commands::check_account_edition` read
`account.json` directly and granted Premium when `subscription_status`
was `"active"`. Any local process could write that JSON and bypass
the paywall without ever touching the Logto session.
Introduce `account_cache` with:
- `save(app, &AccountInfo)` — signs the serialised AccountInfo with
HMAC-SHA256 and writes a `{"data", "sig"}` envelope. The 32-byte
key lives in the OS keychain (service `com.simpl.resultat`, user
`account-hmac-key`) alongside the OAuth tokens from #78.
- `load_unverified` — accepts both signed and legacy payloads for UI
display (name, email, picture). The license path must never use
this.
- `load_verified` — requires a valid HMAC signature; returns None for
legacy payloads, missing keychain, tampered data. Used by
`check_account_edition` so Premium stays locked until the next
token refresh re-signs the cache.
- `delete` — wipes both the file and the keychain key on logout so
the next session generates a fresh cryptographic anchor.
`auth_commands::handle_auth_callback` and `refresh_auth_token` now
call `account_cache::save` instead of writing the file directly.
`logout` clears both stores. `get_account_info` delegates to
`load_unverified` so upgraded users see their profile immediately.
Trust boundary: the HMAC key lives in the keychain and shares its
security model with the OAuth tokens. If the keychain is unreachable,
the gating path refuses to grant Premium (fail-closed), which matches
the store_mode policy introduced in #78.
Refs #66, CWE-345
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The new token_store module (#78) depends on `sync-secret-service` via
`dbus-secret-service`, which in turn links to libdbus-1 at build time
through the `dbus` crate. Add `libdbus-1-dev` to:
- `check.yml` rust job (alongside the existing webkit/appindicator
system deps), so every PR run compiles the keyring backend.
- `release.yml` Linux deps step, so tagged builds link correctly.
Runtime requires `libdbus-1-3`, which is present on every desktop
Linux distro by default, so `.deb` / `.rpm` depends stay unchanged.
Also add a non-blocking `cargo audit` step to check.yml to surface
advisories across the transitive dep graph (zbus, dbus-secret-service,
etc.) without failing unrelated PRs.
Drop `appimage` from `bundle.targets` in tauri.conf.json: the release
workflow explicitly builds `--bundles deb,rpm` so AppImage was never
shipped, and its presence in the config risks a silent fallback to
plaintext token storage for anyone running `tauri build` locally
without libsecret/libdbus bundled into the AppImage. No behaviour
change for CI; follow-up to re-enable AppImage properly would need a
linuxdeploy workflow that bundles the backend.
Refs #66
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce a new token_store module that persists OAuth tokens in the OS
keychain (Credential Manager on Windows, Secret Service on Linux through
sync-secret-service + crypto-rust, both pure-Rust backends).
- Keychain service name matches the Tauri bundle identifier
(com.simpl.resultat) so credentials are scoped to the real app
identity.
- Transparent migration on first load: a legacy tokens.json is copied
into the keychain, then zeroed and unlinked before removal to reduce
refresh-token recoverability from unallocated disk blocks.
- Store-mode flag (keychain|file) persisted next to the auth dir.
After a successful keychain write the store refuses to silently
downgrade to the file fallback, so a subsequent failure forces
re-authentication instead of leaking plaintext.
- New get_token_store_mode command exposes the current mode to the
frontend so a settings banner can warn users running on the file
fallback.
- auth_commands.rs refactored: all tokens.json read/write/delete paths
go through token_store; check_subscription_status now uses
token_store::load().is_some() to trigger migration even when the
24h throttle would early-return.
Refs #66
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The listener `app.listen("deep-link://new-url", ...)` did not reliably
fire when tauri-plugin-single-instance (deep-link feature) forwarded a
simpl-resultat://auth/callback URL to the running instance. The user
saw the browser complete the OAuth flow, the app regain focus, and
then sit in "loading" forever because the listener never received the
URL.
Switch to the canonical Tauri v2 API — `app.deep_link().on_open_url()`
via DeepLinkExt — which is directly coupled to the deep-link plugin
and catches URLs from both initial launch and single-instance forwards.
Also surface OAuth error responses: if the callback URL contains an
`error` parameter instead of a `code`, emit `auth-callback-error` so
the UI can show the error instead of staying stuck in "loading".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The auto-update gate added in #48 requires the Base edition, but the
license server (#49) needed to grant Base does not exist yet. This
chicken-and-egg left the only current user — myself — unable to
receive the critical v0.7.1 OAuth callback fix via auto-update.
Add EDITION_FREE to the auto-update feature tiers as a temporary
measure. The gate will be restored to [BASE, PREMIUM] once paid
activation works end-to-end via the Phase 2 license server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Maximus Account sign-in flow was broken in v0.7.0: clicking "Sign in"
opened Logto in the browser, but when the OAuth2 callback fired
simpl-resultat://auth/callback?code=..., the OS launched a second app
instance instead of routing the URL to the running one. The second
instance had no PKCE verifier in memory, and the original instance
never received the deep-link event, leaving it stuck in "loading".
Fix: register tauri-plugin-single-instance (with the deep-link feature)
as the first plugin. It forwards the callback URL to the existing
process, which triggers the existing deep-link://new-url listener and
completes the token exchange.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update the default LOGTO_APP_ID to match the Native App registered
in the Logto instance at auth.lacompagniemaximus.com.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The auth callback is handled exclusively via the deep-link handler in
lib.rs — exposing it as a JS-invocable command is unnecessary attack
surface. The frontend listens for auth-callback-success/error events
instead.
Plaintext token storage documented as known limitation (see #66).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Privacy-first: remove 'https:' from img-src CSP directive to prevent
IP leaks via external avatar URLs (Google/Gravatar). AccountCard now
shows user initials instead of loading a remote image.
Also remove .keys-temp/ from .gitignore (not relevant to this PR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use write_restricted() for auth/last_check file (consistent 0600)
- Add useAuth hook to the hooks table in docs/architecture.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
account.json contains PII and subscription_status — apply the same
restricted file permissions as tokens.json.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Replace hand-rolled base64 encoder with base64::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD crate
- Set 0600 permissions on tokens.json via write_restricted() helper (Unix)
- Replace chrono_now() .unwrap() with .unwrap_or_default()
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- extract_auth_code now URL-decodes the code parameter to handle
percent-encoded characters from the OAuth provider
- Replace Mutex::lock().unwrap() with .lock().map_err() in start_oauth
and handle_auth_callback to avoid panics on poisoned mutex
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace hash_pin(pin)? with hash_pin(pin).ok() so that a rehash
failure does not propagate as an error. The user can now switch
profiles even if the Argon2id re-hashing step fails — the PIN
is still correctly verified, and the legacy hash remains until
the next successful login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add automatic re-hashing of legacy SHA-256 PINs to Argon2id on
successful verification, returning new hash to frontend for persistence
- Use constant-time comparison (subtle::ConstantTimeEq) for both
Argon2id and legacy SHA-256 hash verification
- Add unit tests for hash_pin, verify_pin (Argon2id and legacy paths),
re-hashing flow, error cases, and hex encoding roundtrip
- Update frontend to handle VerifyPinResult struct and save rehashed
PIN hash via profile update
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace SHA-256 with Argon2id (m=64MiB, t=3, p=1) for PIN hashing.
Existing SHA-256 hashes are verified transparently via format detection
(argon2id: prefix). New PINs are always hashed with Argon2id.
Addresses CWE-916: Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previous test refactor wrapped both keys in their respective DER
envelopes. CI surfaced the asymmetry: jsonwebtoken's two from_ed_der
constructors expect different inputs.
- EncodingKey::from_ed_der → PKCS#8 v1 wrapped (ring's
Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8 path). The 16-byte prefix + 32-byte seed
blob is correct.
- DecodingKey::from_ed_der → raw 32-byte public key. Internally it
becomes ring's UnparsedPublicKey::new(&ED25519, key_bytes), which
takes the bare bytes, NOT a SubjectPublicKeyInfo wrapper.
The test was building an SPKI DER for the public key, so verification
saw a malformed key and failed every signature with InvalidSignature
(`accepts_well_formed_base_license` and `activation_token_matches_machine`).
Drop the SPKI helper, pass `signing_key.verifying_key().to_bytes()`
straight into DecodingKey::from_ed_der. Inline doc-comment captures
the asymmetry so the next person doesn't fall in the same hole.
cargo CI flagged: `unresolved import ed25519_dalek::pkcs8::LineEnding`. The
`LineEnding` re-export path varies between pkcs8/spki/der versions, so the
test code that called `to_pkcs8_pem(LineEnding::LF)` won't compile against
the dependency tree we get with ed25519-dalek 2.2 + pkcs8 0.10.
Fix:
- Drop the `pem` feature from the ed25519-dalek dev-dependency.
- In tests, build the PKCS#8 v1 PrivateKeyInfo and SubjectPublicKeyInfo
DER blobs manually from the raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed/public key. The
Ed25519 layout is fixed (16-byte prefix + 32-byte key) so this is short
and stable.
- Pass the resulting DER bytes to `EncodingKey::from_ed_der` /
`DecodingKey::from_ed_der`.
Refactor:
- Extract `strict_validation()` and `embedded_decoding_key()` helpers so
the validation config (mandatory exp/iat for CWE-613) lives in one
place and production callers all share the same DecodingKey constructor.
- `validate_with_key` and `validate_activation_with_key` now take a
`&DecodingKey` instead of raw PEM bytes; production builds the key
once via `embedded_decoding_key()`.
- New canary test `embedded_public_key_pem_parses` fails fast if the
embedded PEM constant ever becomes malformed.
Introduces the offline license infrastructure for the Base/Premium editions.
- jsonwebtoken (EdDSA) verifies license JWTs against an embedded Ed25519
public key. The exp claim is mandatory (CWE-613) and is enforced via
Validation::set_required_spec_claims.
- Activation tokens (server-issued, machine-bound) prevent license.key
copying between machines. Storage is wired up; the actual issuance flow
ships with Issue #49.
- get_edition() fails closed to "free" when the license is missing,
invalid, expired, or activated for a different machine.
- New commands/entitlements module centralizes feature → tier mapping so
Issue #48 (and any future gate) reads from a single source of truth.
- machine-uid provides the cross-platform machine identifier; OS reinstall
invalidates the activation token by design.
- Tests cover happy path, expiry, wrong-key signature, malformed JWT,
unknown edition, and machine_id matching for activation tokens.
The embedded PUBLIC_KEY_PEM is the RFC 8410 §10.3 test vector, clearly
labelled as a development placeholder; replacing it with the production
public key is a release-time task.
Includes fixes#34, #37, #39: budget prev year actuals, changelog sync via Vite, inline buildPrevYearTotalMap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add per-section subtotals (expenses, income, transfers) to budget table
and budget vs actual report. Fix category detail panel visibility when
scrolling through long category lists.
Closes#11, closes#12
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add table/chart toggle for Trends, By Category, and Over Time reports
- Add "Show amounts" toggle to display values on chart elements
- Add filter panel with category checkboxes and source dropdown
- Add source filter at SQL level for all chart report queries
- Add sticky headers on Dynamic Report and Budget vs Actual tables
- Add interactive hover: dimmed non-hovered bars, filtered tooltip, legend hover
- Fix comment icon color to match split indicator (orange) (#7)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous approach deleted migration records to force re-application,
but this is dangerous for migration 2 which DELETEs all categories and
keywords before re-inserting them, wiping user customizations.
Now computes the expected SHA-384 checksum (matching sqlx) and updates
the stored checksum in _sqlx_migrations, so the migration is recognized
as already applied without being re-run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bump version to 0.5.0 and update CHANGELOG with all unreleased changes
including error handling, log viewer, report improvements, and GPL-3.0
license addition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add repair_migrations Tauri command that deletes stale migration 1
checksum from _sqlx_migrations before Database.load(). Migration 1
is idempotent (CREATE IF NOT EXISTS) so re-applying is safe.
Fixes "migration 1 was previously applied but has been modified".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Forgejo runner's default image uses glibc 2.39, which produces
binaries incompatible with Pop!_OS / Ubuntu 22.04 (glibc 2.35).
Build inside container: ubuntu:22.04 with Node.js and Rust installed.
Bump to v0.4.4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Forgejo has no /releases/latest/download/ route (GitHub-specific)
- Upload latest.json to generic package registry for a stable endpoint
- Fix Linux signature collection: use .AppImage.sig (not .tar.gz.sig)
- Collect all platform signatures (.deb.sig, .rpm.sig, .AppImage.sig)
- Bump to v0.4.3
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add Windows cross-compile (cargo-xwin) to Forgejo CI workflow
- Add libsqlite3-sys bundled for cross-compile compatibility
- Switch updater endpoint from GitHub to self-hosted Forgejo
- Collect Windows NSIS assets and include windows-x86_64 in latest.json
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restore seed_categories.sql to its original content so the migration 2
checksum matches existing databases. Move the level-3 insurance
subcategories (310-312) into a new migration 7 using INSERT OR IGNORE.
Add .catch() on connectActiveProfile() to surface DB errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add .forgejo/workflows/release.yml for Forgejo Actions
- Update signing pubkey for new key pair
- Sync Cargo.toml version to 0.4.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
